“Lock Her Up?” Sentencing in contempt proceedings

Around a decade ago chants of “lock her up” punctuated wall-to-wall news coverage of the Republican Party rallies taking place ahead of the historic US election in November 2016. Those chants were directed at Hillary Clinton, the first woman to win a major party’s presidential nomination.

In 2017, the first year of the first Trump presidency, the parties in Re: B (A child) (Sentencing in contempt proceedings) [2025] EWCA Civ 1048 separated. In September of that year the mother (“AB”) relocated from Slovakia to England with the parties’ daughter (“A”), without the father’s knowledge or consent. The father (“PK”) remained living in Slovakia, where, post A’s relocation, he served a term of imprisonment for fraud.

This article considers the judgment in Re: B and addresses the difficulties encountered in respect of locating the subsequent judgment arising from the matter being remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of the mother’s sentence.

The background to Re:B

In 2019 the father issued return proceedings under the 1980 Hague Convention, which were refused on Article 12 settlement grounds (the parties’ daughter having become settled in England for more than 12 months). Thereafter, in 2020, the father issued further applications under section 8 of the Children Act 1989 in relation to A, and pursuant to Article 21 of the Convention in respect of effective rights of access. A fact-finding hearing in respect of domestic abuse allegations made by the mother took place in August 2021 before HHJ Lloyd-Jones, where they were found not proved (her application for permission to appeal the fact-finding judgment was refused in December 2021).

The final orders in the substantive children proceedings were made in May 2023. The child arrangements order made provided for A to live with her mother; and the mother’s application to terminate the father’s parental responsibility was refused. The specific issues orders made required:

1. the mother to provide monthly written welfare updates about A to the father; and
2. the mother to facilitate A meeting the child’s guardian for the purposes of storyboard work about her father, paternal family, and the proceedings

Notably, the first specific issue order (“SIO 1”) was first made in April 2021 (thereafter it had been ordered again in June 2021 and September 2021). The May 2023 incarnation of SIO 1 was the first time it had been backed by a penal notice. Following the May 2023 order, SIO 1 was again made on 15 August 2023 (backed by penal notice), 23 August 2023 (backed by penal notice), as well as in November 2023 and January 2024 (both times backed by penal notice).

The second specific issue order (“SIO 2”) was first made at the May 2023 hearing. It was made again on 15 August 2023, 23 August 2023, and in November 2023. Thereafter it was made again in January 2024 (the first time it was backed by a penal notice) and in June 2024 (backed by penal notice).

For her part, the mother “has been and remains utterly opposed to complying with the orders, saying that to do so would cause harm to A”. It should be noted that the limited, child-focused orders made were envisioned as being part of a step-by-step approach towards building A’s relationship with her father and understanding her own life story and identity.

By his first two committal applications for contempt (June 2024 and August 2024), the father secured findings of contempt. On the first occasion the mother was also fined £250; on the second, £500 (to be paid in monthly instalments). Again, the mother refused to comply.

It is apparent from the separate reported judgment (HHJ Vincent) bearing the same case number that A was 8 years old on 5 June 2024 (A father v A mother [2024] EWFC 127 (B)). The same judgment makes clear that each party had been assisted at the relevant hearing by a Slovakian interpreter.

The decision at first instance

The Court of Appeal’s judgment relates to the third set of contempt proceedings brought by the father. The determination of the contempt application took place on 18 March 2025 before Henke J, where the judge found the mother to be in breach of six allegations set out in a schedule of breaches, all of which related to the two specific issue orders. These findings were made to the criminal standard, and were based chiefly on the mother’s own admissions (her application for permission to appeal the findings made was refused as being totally without merit in July 2025).

At the end of the March 2025 contempt hearing the judge adjourned the mother’s sentencing for a month, “only because of A” (quoted at [16]). The judge (quoted extensively in the Court of Appeal’s judgment at [16]) made her views unequivocal:

“I will see you in a month’s time, by which time, I expect to be told that the guardian has seen A. You need to make a very big decision as to what’s in your daughter’s best interest. Following court orders that have been made in her best interests or going to prison. […] if I have to sentence you to prison, be under no illusion a sentence is likely to be measured in months not days.”

On 6 May 2025 the sentencing hearing before Henke J took place. The mother had again failed to comply with the court’s orders. Despite the severe warnings given at the March hearing, the judge nevertheless decided to impose no sanction:

“I also take into account the impact on [A] if I were to send her mother to prison. It would be direct, the harm would be emotional, psychological and financial […]  if I make a sentence for imprisonment, suspending it on condition that you comply with a court order, it is likely to simply result in a breach.” (Quoted at [19]).

Instead, the judge invited the mother, the father’s counsel, and A’s guardian in the Children Act proceedings to make submissions about the directions that should be made in respect of the father’s application for A to live with him, and (within the parallel hearing in respect of the welfare proceedings concerning A which took place on the same date) the mother was ordered to ensure A attend an appointment with the guardian, at a CAFCASS office, in June 2025. The order was again backed by a penal notice. Yet again, the mother did not comply.

The father’s appeal

The father sought permission to appeal Henke J’s “no order” decision in respect of his third contempt application. Permission was granted in July 2025. His substantive grounds of appeal submitted that Henke J’s reasoning was deficient and that she had failed to engage with the central purpose of contempt proceedings, ie upholding the court’s authority and effective functioning. It should be noted that the Court of Appeal had considerable sympathy for the position in which Henke J found herself.

Giving judgment, King LJ (with whom Snowden LJ and Falk LJ agreed), found that Henke J had erred in two key respects. First, she should not have accepted that the mother would not comply, based “only on the mother’s current assertion that that was the case”. Second, she was wrong to rely on the mother’s continued non-compliance as a reason not to “punish her for her continuing contempt” Accordingly, the father’s appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to a High Court judge for reconsideration of sentence.

King LJ emphasised that contempt proceedings serve a dual purpose: 1) to mark the court’s disapproval of non-compliance and 2) to secure future compliance. She also cited key dicta from the leading family law contempt authorities to which the Court of Appeal had been referred (Hale v Tanner [2000] EWCA 5570, and Elkndo v Elsyed (Committal: Sentence) [2024] EWHC 2230 (Fam)).

In addition to that dual purpose, the same case law makes plain that the disposal of the contempt application must be proportionate to the seriousness of the contempt, and that where imprisonment is being considered the court needs to be satisfied that the conduct of the party in breach (ie the “contemnor”) is so serious that no other penalty is appropriate – imprisonment being a measure of last resort.

Although not referred to in the judgment, practitioners may also find the following list of tabulated cases helpful in respect of committal proceedings against a child’s primary carer:

What happened next

The Court of Appeal hearing took place on 29 July 2025 with the mother representing herself, aided by an interpreter. Judgment was handed down remotely the following day.

Following this, it does not appear any further judgment or committal order has been published, despite the applicable court rules in relation to committal orders, and the fact that the remitted sentencing hearing was attended and then reported on in detail by the Open Justice Court of Protection Project (“OJCOPP”) on 14 August 2025 (author Celia Kitzinger) – the online article by the same making it clear that the mother was committed to prison for 28 days on 11 August 2025 by Lieven J (as she then was). The OJCOPP has been linked to by the Transparency Project (with which family court practitioners are more likely to be familiar).

In terms of the reporting of family court committal orders and judgments, the key sources of authority are Part 37 and Practice Direction 37A of the Family Procedure Rules 2010, and the separate Practice Direction: Committal for Contempt of Court – Open Court (26 March 2015, updated August 2020).

The notes to the Family Court Practice 2026 in respect of r37.8 FPR 2010 indicate (by analogy with the equivalent Court of Protection Rules, and noting the decision of Poole J in Esper v NHS North West London Integrated Care Board [2023] EWCOP 29) the provisions in the FPR 2010 are likely to take precedence over the 2015/2020 Practice Direction, with which they “co-exist”.

Rule 37.8 FPR 2010 provides as follows:

(6)     Unless and to the extent that the court otherwise directs, where the court acts under paragraph (4) or (5), a copy of the court’s order shall be published on the website of the Judiciary of England and Wales (which may be found at www.judiciary.uk). Any person who is not a party to the proceedings may apply to attend the hearing and make submissions, or apply to set aside or vary the order.

[…]

(13)     The court shall be responsible for ensuring that judgments in contempt proceedings are transcribed and published on the website of the judiciary of England and Wales.

 Paragraph 4 of Practice Direction 37A, FPR 2010 provides:

Responsibility of court for publication of judgments.

While paragraph (13) of rule 37.8 makes the court responsible for the publication of transcripts of judgments in contempt proceedings, it does not require the court to publish a transcript of every judgment, but only in a case where the court makes an order for committal. (Emphasis added.)

It is plain from the OJCOPP article that the 28-day custodial sentence imposed by Lieven J was an immediate one. The following exchange is quoted from the OJCOPP article, which itself makes clear that the text below does not represent direct quotation, but is rather the attendee’s account based on her contemporaneous touch-typed notes – text in parenthesis has been deleted by the authors of this article.

Mother:          I do not understand when she will be- She will be taken away from me today or when is it going to be?

Judge:             Yes. It will be in about 55 minutes.

Mother:          In 45 mins you’re going to take her away from me

Judge:             Yes.

Mother:          Please, please, please don’t do this to her. Please, she-

Judge:             Well […], will you take her to see the Guardian tomorrow morning?

Mother:          Please give me more time.

 […]

Mother:          It’s going to be harmful for her. It’s going to be very harmful to her. In a psychological-

Judge:             I’m really sorry, […]. I’ve heard all that before. I am now going to make a ruling. [Your daughter] will be taken into care and you will go to prison.

(Again, it is reiterated that the above does not represent direct quotation).

Accordingly, it is a committal order that was made, though it does not appear any published judgment pertaining to it has yet been made available. For completeness, the authors of this article have reviewed various resources and databases (including the judiciary.uk website expressly referred to at r37.8(6) FPR 2010) but have been unable to locate Lieven J’s judgment.

The OJCOPP write-up indicates the matter was heard in open court, and regrettably it does seem a significant administrative oversight may have occurred in respect of the judgment not (as it would appear) having been published, which in turn would, on the face of it, belie the open justice principles enunciated in the relevant parts of the 2015/2020 Practice Direction, PD37A FPR 2010, and Part 37 FPR 2010. In an era of mis- and disinformation, the significance of how the family court operates (as conveyed chiefly via reported judgments) should not be underappreciated.

[email protected]

[email protected]